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Abstract 
According to perceptual symbol systems (Barsalou, 1999), sensorimotor simulations underlie the 
representation of concepts. It follows that sensorimotor phenomena should arise in conceptual 
processing. Previous studies have shown that switching from one modality to another during 
perceptual processing incurs a processing cost. If perceptual simulation underlies conceptual 
processing, then verifying the properties of concepts should exhibit a switching cost as well. For 
example, verifying a property in the auditory modality (e.g., BLENDER-loud) should be slower 
after verifying a property in a different modality (e.g., CRANBERRIES-tart) than in the same 
modality (e.g., LEAVES-rustling). Only words were presented to subjects, and there were no 
instructions to use imagery. Nevertheless switching modalities incurred a cost, analogous to 
switching modalities in perception. A second experiment showed that this effect was not due to 
associative priming between properties in the same modality. These results support the hypothesis 
that perceptual simulation underlies conceptual processing. 
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 Modern psychology relies heavily on the digital computer as a metaphor for human cognition 
(e.g., Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984). According to this view, the software of the mind can be 
distinguished from the hardware of the body, with mental representations being amodal 
redescriptions of sensorimotor experience. Increasingly, however, researchers argue that this 
approach is fundamentally wrong, suggesting instead that interactions between sensorimotor systems 
and the physical world underlie cognition. 
 For example, Barsalou’s (1999) theory of perceptual symbol systems proposes that 
conceptual knowledge is grounded in sensorimotor systems. To represent a concept, neural systems 
partially run as if interacting with an actual instance. For example, to represent the concept CHAIR, 
neural systems for vision, action, touch, and emotion partially reenact the experience of a chair. 
Increasingly, behavioral evidence supports this view (e.g., Klatzky, Pellegrino, McCloskey, & 
Doherty, 1989; Solomon & Barsalou, 2001, 2002; Spivey, Tyler, Richardson, & Young, 2000; 
Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Wu & Barsalou, 2002; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxleu, in press), as does 
neural evidence (e.g., Martin, 2001; Martin & Chao, 2001; Martin, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000; 
Pulvermüller, 1999). See Barsalou (1999; in press) and Glenberg (1997) for further evidence. 
Several aspects of sensorimotor simulations are important for the experiments presented 
shortly. First, simulations are componential, not holistic. Rather than being like a holistic video 
recording, a simulation contains many small elements of perception—perceptual symbols—
organized coherently. Second, perceptual symbols arise on all modalities of experience—vision, 
audition, smell, taste, touch, action, emotion, introspection, etc. Third, perceptual symbols vary in 
accessibility. On a given occasion, only those perceptual symbols most active enter a simulation, 
such that the simulations of a concept vary considerably across occasions. Furthermore—and most 
importantly for our purposes—the modalities represented in simulations vary as well. On one 
occasion, the simulation of a concept might focus on how an object looks (e.g., a LEMON is 
yellow); on another occasion, a simulation might focus on how the object tastes (e.g., a LEMON is 
sour).1 Although multiple modalities may typically be represented, one may often be more salient 
than others. Furthermore, over time, the focus may remain in a single modality, or it may switch from 
one modality to another. 
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 If switching between modalities occurs during conceptual processing, then a phenomenon 
from the perception literature is relevant. Spence, Nicholls, and Driver (2000) had subjects 
discriminate whether a signal occurred on the left or the right in any of three modalities monitored 
simultaneously (i.e., a light in vision, a touch on a finger, a tone in audition). When two consecutive 
signals occurred on the same modality, processing stayed within a single system. When consecutive 
signals occurred on different modalities, processing had to switch between systems. Most 
importantly, Spence et al. found that switching modalities incurred a cost: Detecting a signal was 
slower when the previous signal was on a different modality than on the same (also see Spence & 
Driver, 1998). 
 If conceptual processing utilizes sensorimotor systems, then an analogous cost should occur 
when conceptual processing switches from one modality to another. To investigate this prediction, 
we used the property verification task. On target trials, subjects verified a property in one of six 
modalities (vision, audition, taste, smell, touch, action). For example, subjects might verify the 
auditory property loud for BLENDER. On the previous trial, subjects either verified a property from 
a different concept on the same modality or on a different modality (e.g., LEAVES-rustling versus 
CRANBERRIES-tart). Table 1 provides examples of the critical materials. Because the concepts 
on the two trials were always unassociated, no associative priming between concepts should occur. 
Also a high ratio of filler trials to critical trials masked the purpose of the experiment (i.e., the 
number of paired trials on the same modality was relatively small). The key prediction was that 
having to switch modalities would slow verification time, relative to staying within the same modality, 
analogous to modality-switching costs in perceptual processing. 
 Experiment 1 also explored whether the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between 
presentation of the concept and presentation of the property is a factor in switching costs. Perhaps 
switching costs disappear when the property lags behind the concept, because the concept has 
longer to activate properties across modalities. Alternatively, switching costs may remain constant 
across SOAs if subjects do not commit to a dominant modality until receiving the property word. To 
assess these possibilities, some subjects received the concept and property on each trial 
simultaneously (SOA=0 ms), whereas others received the concept first, followed by the property 
260 ms later (SOA=260 ms). 
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   ----------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 1 about here 
   ----------------------------------------------- 
Experiment 1 
Method 
 Subjects and design. Sixty-four volunteers from Emory University participated for course 
credit. Thirty-two were assigned randomly to each of the two between-subjects conditions for 
SOA. Same versus different modality was manipulated within subjects, with equal numbers receiving 
each counterbalanced version of the list. 
 Materials. A set of 100 concept-property items was developed. Each property was more 
salient on one modality than on the others. We selected 26 properties from vision, 24 from motor 
actions, 18 from audition, 12 from touch, 12 from taste, and 8 from smell. Because some modalities 
have more words for properties than others, the number of properties differed across modalities by 
necessity. 
From the 100 concept-property items, 50 pairs were formed. Half contained two properties 
from the same modality; half contained properties from different modalities. The two items forming a 
same-modality pair were chosen randomly from items on the relevant modality. According to the 
norms of Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (1999), the properties in these pairs were not 
associated.2 One item in each same-modality pair was randomly assigned to be presented first (the 
context item), and the other to be presented second (the target item). Table 1 presents an example 
from each modality. The two items comprising a different-modality pair were chosen randomly from 
the remaining items. In pairs of both types, if the two concepts exhibited a relation, they were 
replaced with items having no relation. Two lists were created such that each target had a same 
modality context in one list but a different-modality context in the other. Thus each target item 
appeared with both same-modality and different-modality contexts, counterbalanced across lists. All 
critical properties were true of their respective concepts. 
 The experimental trials included 150 pairs, with 50 being critical, for a total of 300 trials. 
The remaining 100 pairs were fillers, designed to mask the nature of the experiment. Within the filler 
pairs, 50 contained two false items, 25 contained a true item then a false item, and 25 contained a 
false item then a true item. Thus true and false responses were equally likely overall. Properties in 
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the fillers sometimes referred to a specific modality but also referred to properties that are 
represented on multiple modalities (e.g., CAMERA-compact, TOY-plastic, MAP-complicated). 
To ensure that subjects actually verified the properties of concepts (Solomon & Barsalou, 2002), 
the concept and property in many false items were related (e.g., OVEN-baked, BUFFALO-
winged, BUTTERFLY-bird). The critical and filler pairs were randomly intermixed for each subject. 
All concepts and properties were used only once. The practice trials consisted of 24 true items and 
24 false items, similar in nature to the experimental trials. 
 Procedure . Each trial began with a fixation stimulus (* * * * *) two lines above where the 
concept name would appear. After 500 ms, the fixation stimulus disappeared. In the 0 ms SOA 
condition, three lines of text then appeared aligned vertically, each separated from the next by an 
empty line. The first line of text contained the concept word in upper case; the second line contained 
the words “can be” in lowercase; the third line contained the property word in upper case. In the 
260 ms SOA condition, the concept word appeared for 160 ms, then “can be” was added for 100 
ms, then the property name was added. RTs in all cases were measured from the onset of the 
property word. All lines remained on the screen until the subject made a "true" (?/ key) or "false" (z 
key) response. 
 The initial instructions stressed that a decision should be based on whether the property was 
"usually true" of the concept. For example, the pair CARNATION-black could theoretically be 
true, but black would be a highly unusual property for CARNATION. Therefore, the correct 
response for such a property was "false". Subjects received feedback for 600 ms after pressing the 
wrong key (“ERROR”) or after taking 2000 ms or longer to respond (“TOO SLOW”). The next 
trial began 300 ms after the response, or in the case of feedback, 300 ms after the feedback 
disappeared. Because subjects responded to each item individually, nothing indicated that items 
were paired in the underlying design. Also, because only 1 of every 12 trial transitions contained 
properties from the same modality, it was not obvious that modality switching was of interest. 
 The experiment began with 48 practice trials, followed by the 100 critical and 200 filler trials 
in a different random order for each subject. After each block of 50 trials, subjects took a brief 
break and saw the percentage of errors from the previous block. When errors exceeded 15%, 
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subjects were urged to be more accurate. When errors fell below 5%, subjects were complimented. 
When ready, subjects began the next block. 
Results and Discussion 
 RTs were removed for target trials on which errors occurred. Target RTs were also 
removed when subjects erred on the previous context trial, given that an assessment of modality 
switching assumes that subjects processed both the context and target items correctly. When 
subjects erred on a context trial, a variety of complicating factors could affect processing on the 
target trial. Median RTs for same-modality versus different-modality target trials were computed for 
each subject and then averaged across subjects. 
   ----------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 2 about here 
   ----------------------------------------------- 
 As Table 2 illustrates, RTs on the target trials were slower when the modality switched from 
the context trial to the target trial than when modality remained constant, F(1,62)=6.87, p<.05. 
Although the switching effect was slightly larger in the 0 ms SOA condition than in the 260 ms SOA 
condition (29 ms vs. 20 ms), the interaction between SOA and switching was not significant, 
F(1,62)=0.24. No effects occurred for errors, indicating that a speed-accuracy tradeoff was 
unlikely. 
 The effect of SOA was significant, F(1,62)=56.12, p<.01. Subjects in the 260 ms SOA 
condition were 270 ms faster than subjects in the 0 ms SOA condition.  The near equivalence 
between the difference in RTs and the difference in SOAs indicates that subjects in the 260 ms 
SOA condition began task-relevant processing immediately on receiving the concept in isolation. By 
the time the property arrived, these subjects were further into the necessary processing than the 0 
ms SOA subjects. Most importantly, however, the effect of modality switching occurred for both 
groups. 
 We began with the hypothesis that modality-specific brain areas represent properties in 
concepts. Based on this assumption, we predicted that switching modalities while verifying 
properties would incur a processing cost, analogous to the cost incurred while switching modalities 
in perceptual processing. Unlike perceptual studies, however, the switching costs here occurred 
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while subjects processed linguistic stimuli, not perceptual ones. This suggests that the linguistic stimuli 
initiated sensorimotor simulations, which behaved similarly to sensorimotor processing. 
Experiment 2 
 An alternative explanation remains to be addressed. Perhaps properties across all modalities 
are stored together in a single system of amodal knowledge. Within this system, amodal symbols 
that represent properties from the same modality are associated to each other, such that they prime 
each other when processed sequentially. If so, then these associations could underlie the switching 
costs in Experiment 1. When a subject verifies two properties from the same modality, associations 
between their amodal symbols speed processing, relative to properties from different modalities 
whose symbols are not associated. 
 As already noted, the critical property pairs in Experiment 1 were not associated in 
the Nelson et al. (1999) norms. Perhaps, however, these norms are not sufficiently sensitive to 
detect weak associations that link properties from the same modality. This hypothesis can be tested 
by using highly associated property pairs from the Nelson et al. norms. If associations speed same-
modality pairs whose normed associative strengths are 0 (i.e., nonmeasurable), then even greater 
priming should occur as associative strength increases.  
Thus Experiment 2 sampled pairs of properties from the Nelson et al. norms that are highly 
associated (e.g., spotless-clean; polyester-cheap). These associated properties were then combined 
with concepts to form pairs of verification trials (e.g., “SHEET can be SPOTLESS”—“AIR can be 
CLEAN”; “SHIRT can be POLYESTER”—“MEAL can be CHEAP”). If the associative 
hypothesis is correct, then substantial priming should be found for the second members of these 
pairs, relative to when the context and target items have unassociated properties (e.g., “SHEET can 
be SPOTLESS”—“MEAL can be CHEAP”). 
In contrast, we did not predict an associativeness effect. Many previous studies have found 
that priming diminishes substantially—and typically disappears—when an unrelated word separates 
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two associated words (Bentin & Feldman, 1990; Dannenbring & Briand, 1982; Joordens & 
Besner, 1992; Masson, 1995; McNamara, 1992). Given that three words stood between 
properties on adjacent trials in Experiment 1, it seems unlikely that the first property could have 
primed the second associatively. For example, in “LEAVES can be RUSTLING” followed by 
“BLENDER can be LOUD”, the three words “BLENDER can be” lie between “RUSTLING” and 
“LOUD”. We expected that these intervening words would extinguish any possible priming.3 
In addition to the strongly associated properties, we also presented pairs of unassociated 
properties from the same vs. different modalities (a replication of Experiment 1). First, we wanted to 
replicate the modality shifting effect in another experiment. Second, we wanted to directly compare 
this effect with any associative priming effect. Because highly associated properties are necessary for 
testing the effect of association, whereas unassociated properties are necessary for testing the 
modality-switching effect, different property pairs were used to test the two effects. 
Method 
 Subjects and design. Eighty-eight volunteers from Emory University participated for 
course credit. Associated versus unassociated pairs were manipulated within subjects, as were same 
vs. different modalities, with counterbalanced versions of the list being distributed equally across 
subjects. 
 Materials. Thirty pairs of associated properties were selected from the Nelson et al. 
(1999) norms that averaged 23.1% in associative frequency (i.e., how often the second property 
was produced as an association of the first). This is a very high level of associative strength, with 
approximately 95% of the words in the norms having a lower first associate (Nelson, personal 
communication). The first property in a pair was always the cue in the norms, and the second 
property was always a response. The introduction to this experiment provides examples. 
 Two critical lists were formed from the 30 pairs of associated properties. In one list, 15 of 
the associated pairs remained intact, and the other 15 were scrambled to form unassociated pairs 
(as illustrated in the introduction). In the other list, the first 15 pairs were scrambled to form 
unassociated pairs, whereas the second 15 pairs remained intact to form associated pairs. Each 
property was combined with a concept for which the property was true. 
Switching costs in property verification - 10 - 
 An additional 30 pairs of trials were selected from the materials of Experiment 1. Two lists 
were created so that each list contained 15 pairs from the same modality and 15 from different ones. 
For the same modality pairs, the associative strength between properties was 0. Across lists, each 
concept-property combination occurred in both conditions. 
 An additional set of 120 filler pairs was constructed. Within these fillers, 60 contained 2 
false items, 30 contained a true item then a false item, and 30 contained a false item then a true item. 
Fifteen of the false filler items were associatively related to the previous trial, and 15 were in the 
same modality as the previous trial. Thus, the relation between two consecutive trials was not 
predictive of the correct response for the second trial. Subjects could not give a "true" response on 
the basis of the previous item being associated or in the same modality. The remaining 90 filler pairs 
were unrelated. The practice materials consisted of 48 additional trials that were comparable to the 
experimental materials. No concept or property was repeated across the materials. 
 Procedure . The 0 ms SOA procedure from Experiment 1 was used here. 
Results and Discussion 
 As in the previous experiment, target trials were removed either when subjects erred in 
response, or when they erred on the previous context trial. Median RTs in the relevant conditions 
were computed for each subject and then averaged. 
   ----------------------------------------------- 
    Insert Table 3 about here 
   ----------------------------------------------- 
 As Table 3 illustrates, an associative priming effect did not occur in the RTs, 
F(1,87)=0.016, or in the errors, F(1,87)=0.22. Unassociated properties were not reliably slower 
than associated properties, indicating that associations between properties did not underlie the 
switching effect in Experiment 1. Indeed, these two condition differed by only 1 ms. In contrast, the 
RTs on the different modality trials were 41 ms slower than those on the same modality trials, 
F(1,87)=9.40, p<.01. The difference between associative priming and modality switching was 
nearly significant in the two-way interaction, F(1,87)=3.76, p=.056. The error data did not show a 
significant effect of modality switching, nor a significant interaction.4 
 As these results show, associative strength does not explain the switching costs in 
Experiment 1. If associations between properties from the same modality had been responsible, an 
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associative effect should have occurred in Experiment 2, given that the property pairs were much 
more associated than those in Experiment 1. Instead, no associative priming effect was obtained, 
whereas there was again a reliable effect of modality switching. This leaves modality-specific 
processing as the best account of the switching costs. After a 
property is verified, attention rests on its modality. If the subsequent property resides on a different 
modality, attention must shift, thereby incurring a cost. 
General Discussion 
 According to perceptual symbols theory (Barsalou, 1999), simulations in sensorimotor areas 
represent properties during conceptual processing. If the conceptual system rests on sensorimotor 
systems, then phenomena in perceptual processing should also occur in conceptual processing, at 
least to some extent. Thus, the presence of switching costs in perceptual processing suggests that 
analogous switching costs should occur during property verification. 
 The results of Experiments 1 and 2 support this prediction. When subjects verified pairs of 
properties, they verified the second property faster when it came from the same modality as the first 
property than when it came from a different modality. Experiment 2 ruled out the alternative 
hypothesis that associations between properties from the same modality were responsible. When 
subjects verified a pair of associated properties, no priming occurred, even though the associations 
between them were considerably stronger than any associations that might have existed between 
properties from the same modality in Experiments 1 and 2. Thus, switching from one modality-
specific brain system to another appears to be the critical factor in these experiments—not 
associative strength. Recent neuroimaging work on the localization of concepts corroborates this 
conclusion (e.g., Martin, 2001; Martin & Chao, 2001; Martin et al., 2000), as does the literature on 
lesion-based conceptual deficits (e.g., McRae & Cree, in press; Simmons & Barsalou, 2002). 
Recent fMRI work in our lab shows that verifying the six types of properties assessed in 
Experiments 1 and 2 activates the respective modality-specific neural systems (Pecher, Hamann, 
Simmons, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2002). 
 One issue is the generality of the modality-shifting effect. Within the experiments reported 
here—and subsequent ones like them—all six modalities generally exhibit trends in the predicted 
direction (due to the noisiness of the data and the small number of properties on each modality, 
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individual trends are rarely significant). Across four replications of the basic paradigm—an 
unpublished initial experiment, Experiment 1 (SOA=0), Experiment 1 (SOA=260), and Experiment 
2—the mean differences between the same-modality RTs and the different modality RTs were: 37, 
28, -7, 65 for vision; 42, -2, -38, 43 for audition; 48, 48, 20, 39 for motor; 86, 59, 104, -18 for 
smell; 10, 32, 100, 10 for taste; -10, 42, -20, -34 for touch. In a given experiment, not every 
modality shows a trend, but across experiments, each modality shows one at least once.5 
A related issue is whether modality shifting effects occur for properties that do not come 
from the six modalities we address, such as the properties of abstract concepts. Barsalou (1999) 
suggests that abstract concepts draw heavily on introspective experience, such as emotional states 
and cognitive operations.  Wiemer-Hastings, Krug, and Xu (2001) provide evidence for this 
hypothesis. To the extent that other sorts of properties arise on different modalities of experience, 
shifting effects should occur between them as well. For example, if emotion and cognitive operations 
constitute different domains of introspection, they might exhibit shifting effects. This issue awaits 
further research. 
 Together with other recent evidence, the findings here converge on the conclusion that the 
conceptual system is grounded in sensorimotor simulation. It is becoming increasingly difficult to 
argue that the conceptual system is completely modular and amodal. To the contrary, the conceptual 
system appears to share many mechanisms with perception and action, thereby making it non-
modular and modal. 
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Footnotes 
1  Notationally, we will use uppercase italics to represent concepts, lowercase italics to represent 
properties, and quotes to represent linguistic forms (words, sentences). 
2  Although most of the target properties were found in the Nelson et al. norms, not all were. Those 
properties found did not have their paired properties as associations. Those properties not found 
in the Nelson et al. norms were comparable, appearing unassociated. Experiment 2 addressed 
associativeness directly and found that it was not a factor in these experiments. 
3  One might argue that the words “can be” actually do not count as full content words, and thus 
may not decrease priming.  Nevertheless there is still one completely unrelated content word 
between the two properties, namely, the concept for the second one.  The work just cited shows 
that even one intervening word can dissipate priming between two related words. 
4  An earlier experiment also showed no effect for a large manipulation of associative strength in a 
similar design. Thus the absence of an associative effect appears robust. 
5  Because the critical the items were rotated through a counter-balanced design, item analyses are 
technically not necessary (Raaijmakers, Schrijnemakers, & Gremmen, 1999). For the record, 
though, in three cases of the four cases where an items test was possible, an effect was present 
(unpublished pilot experiment, t(44)=2.28; Experiment 1 (SOA=0), t(49)=2.44, Experiment 1 
(SOA=260), t(49)=0.87; Experiment 2, t(29)=3.92). The critical effect is generally present 
across items. 
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Table 1. 
Examples of the Target and Context Trials from the Six Modalities in Experiment 1. 
  
  Context trial  
Modality Target trial Same modality Different modality  
Audition BLENDER-loud LEAVES-rustling CRANBERRIES-tart 
Vision BABY CLOTHES-pastel HAIR-fair TOAST-warm 
Taste CUCUMBER-bland BUTTERMILK-sour BIRD EGG-speckled 
Smell SOAP-perfumed OLD BOOK-musty TELEVISION-noisy 
Touch MARBLE-cool PEANUT BUTTER-sticky BED SPRINGS-squeaking 
Motor FAUCET-turned ROCK-hurled HIGHWAY SIGN-green 
  
Note. The context trial immediately preceded the target trial. The concept and property were presented in a 
sentence frame stating the possibility that the “CONCEPT can be PROPERTY.” 
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Table 2. 
Mean Reaction Times and Error Rates in Experiment 1 for Verifying Properties on Target 
Trials Following a Context Trial Either on the Same Modality or on a Different Modality 
(Standard Errors Shown in Parenthesis). 
  
  0 ms SOA   260 ms SOA  
Context trial  RTs (SE) Errors (SE)  RTs (SE) Errors (SE) 
  
Same modality 1124 (27.8) 5.1 (0.83) 859 (23.3) 5.0 (0.71) 
Different modality 1153 (28.9) 5.6 (1.38) 879 (24.7) 4.0 (0.76) 
 
Switching cost 29 0.5 20 -1.0 
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Table 3. 
Mean Reaction Times and Error Rates in Experiment 2 (Standard Errors Shown in 
Parenthesis). 
___________________________________________________ 
Context trial  RTs (SE) Errors (SE)  
___________________________________________________ 
 
Associatively related 1143 (15.4)   9.9 (0.82)  
Associatively unrelated 1144 (14.6) 10.2 (0.72)  
 
Priming       1   0.3  
 
Same modality 1186 (14.9)   5.6 (0.63) 
Different modality 1227 (17.2)   6.5 (0.65) 
 
Switching cost     41   0.9 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
